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Abstract: This paper empirically examines whether expansion of the EU has 
increased international tax competition. To do so, we use a simple model of tax 
competition to determine how a given country weights the taxes of others when 
choosing its own tax. This indicates that the market potential of a country (which 
includes both domestic consumption and exports) is the appropriate weight. This is an 
improvement on the ad-hoc and often endogenous weighting schemes used elsewhere. 
Unlike those studies, we find robust evidence for tax competition. In particular, our 
estimates suggest that EU membership affects responses with EU members 
responding more to the tax rates of other members. This lends credence to the above-
noted concerns. 
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1. Introduction 
 There is no doubt that one of the foremost policy issues surrounding public 
finance in the European Union (EU) – and the world beyond – is the issue of tax 
competition. There have been long-standing concerns that as nations compete for 
mobile investment that this has resulted in a race to the bottom in taxes, resulting in 
underprovision of public goods as well as potential distortions in firm decisions. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows average tax rates across a number of developed 
countries, there is a clear downward trend in taxes, potentially indicative of such a 
race to the bottom. IMF Deputy Director Murilo Portugal (2007) verbalizes these 
fears stating “there is equally little doubt that globalization is likely to have a 
substantial effect on countries' ability to sustain tax revenues”. These concerns have 
grown alongside the expansion of the EU, with the belief that falling trade barriers 
between members may have led to an intensification of tax competition. This view 
has been vigorously championed by current French president Nicolas Sarkozy who 
has repeatedly blasted the new accession countries for cutting their tax rates shortly 
after joining the EU and threatened their EU aid payments saying that “nations can’t 
claim to be rich enough to do away with taxes while also claiming to be poor enough 
to ask other nations to provide funds for them” (Crumley, 2004).  
The goal of this paper is to empirically investigate whether tax competition 
has intensified as a result of EU expansion. In doing so, we advance the empirical tax 
competition literature in two ways. First, we use the first theory-driven weighting 
scheme, one in which the importance attached to a nation’s tax rate depends on its 
market potential (which includes the domestic market and exports). As noted by 
Anselin (1988), specification of this scheme is of paramount importance in this type 
of analysis. Second, we examine the extent to which countries respond to one another 
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differently depending on EU membership. Our estimates provide robust evidence of 
tax competition consistent with the race to the bottom. Furthermore, we find that the 
extent of competition depends on EU membership, with EU members responding 
more competitively to tax cuts by EU members than by non-members. This then 
provides support for the above-noted fears. 
Despite the large theoretic literature on international tax competition and an 
equally voluminous public debate on the topic, the empirical evidence on the 
international interdependence of taxes is remarkably limited.1 To fill this void, 
researchers have begun to employ spatial econometric methods to gain insight into 
how the tax set in one country affects that set in another. This method involves using 
an instrumented value for the weighted average of other nations’ taxes as an 
explanatory variable for a given country tax. The weighting scheme is an assumption 
that implies that some external tax rates matter more than others. For example, 
weighting by distance implies that proximate countries’ taxes matter more than distant 
ones whereas weighting by GDP implies that taxes of large countries matter more 
than those of small ones. Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) utilize data on 
OECD countries and find that, depending on the weights, they obtain a significant 
spatial lag (the term used for the coefficient on the other nations’ taxes). In particular, 
when weighting by GDP, they find a positive spatial lag, i.e. higher taxes elsewhere 
imply a higher tax in a given country. In game theoretic terms, this is equivalent to 
evidence of strategic complementarity, a key requirement for the oft-discussed race to 
the bottom. Other weighting schemes provide less robust results. Altshuler and 
Goodspeed (2007) weight by distance and find some evidence that two year changes 
                                                 
1 Wilson (1999), Gresik (2001), and Fuest, Huber, and Mintz (2005) survey the theory literature on tax 
competition as well as the empirical work on how firms respond to taxation. Note that this latter issue 
is quite distinct from evidence of tax competition as it shows how agents respond to taxes, not how 
taxes in one country depend on those set in another. 
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in a country’s tax rate are positively correlated with the comparable change in other 
nations’ taxes. Overesch and Rinke (2008) also weight by distance and find similar 
results for the level of taxes. Similarly, Crabbe and Vandenbussche (2008) examine 
the taxes of the EU15 countries as they depend on the taxes of the new accession 
countries, finding a positive correlation for nations adjacent to the new accession 
countries.2 Finally, several studies, including Garretsen and Peeters (2007), Redoano 
(2007), Dreher (2006), and Haufler, Klemm, and Schjelderup (2006), utilize equal 
weights (i.e. the simple average of other nations’ taxes) with mixed results. 
These weighting schemes suffer from two shortcomings. First, they are ad-
hoc. While economic motivations for the importance of proximity or size can be 
made, the lack of a model indicating why they are important can lead to deceptive 
results. As discussed by Anselin (1988), the weighting scheme is of paramount 
importance and that improper specification can yield misleading and spurious results. 
Using a simple economic geography model of firm location akin to that of Baldwin 
and Krugman (2004), we find that countries with large market potentials receive the 
greatest weight. Here, market potential includes not only the domestic market, but 
also those that can be served by exporting from this country.3 The intuition is 
straightforward. If another country lowers its tax, will firms choose to move there? 
The answer lies in how profitable this location is. Large countries tend to be profitable 
since they have many consumers that can be served locally, thereby avoiding trade 
costs. Similarly, countries that have easy access to other markets are attractive 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that their investigation differs from ours in two critical ways. First, they only 
consider the EU members; we consider a broader selection of nations. Second, and more importantly, 
they only allow the new member taxes to affect the taxes of the EU15. Thus, they do not consider 
whether EU15 taxes depend on other EU15 taxes, nor whether new member taxes depend on EU15 
taxes. This is therefore a very different approach to the issue than the one we take here.  
3 This is akin to the export-platform FDI literature. Theory work in this area includes Ekholm, Forslid, 
and Markusen (2007) while empirical work includes Head and Mayer (2004), Blonigen, Davies, 
Waddell, Naughton (2007), and Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayer (2007). 
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because of their export platform capabilities. Thus, these two factors combine to 
provide a theory-motivated weighting scheme. Note that while GDP is certainly 
correlated with the size of the domestic market and net exports, it under-weights small 
countries that import a lot from other countries. Similarly, distance is correlated with 
trade between two countries but, as a wealth of trade regressions indicate, it only 
explains a portion of trade levels. Furthermore, using distance between, say, Ireland 
and the UK when determining the Irish tax rate ignores the ability of the UK to export 
to other nations.  As discussed in papers such as Head and Ries (2004) and Blonigen, 
et. al (2007, 2008), failure to account for proximity to other markets gives a poor 
measure of market potential, indicating the weakness of this weight. 
In addition to the above problem, using a weight such as GDP is problematic 
because if FDI affects GDP and taxes affect FDI, then the weight itself is endogenous 
to the tax rate. As such, the constructed instrument does not resolve the endogeneity 
problem spatial econometrics is intended to solve. We find that in our data, even when 
using our market potential weighting scheme, failure to control for endogeneity leads 
to coefficient estimates that are biased towards zero.  
An additional limitation of the existing literature is that it assumes that all 
countries respond in identical fashions to others’ taxes. Thus, it imposes the 
assumption that a country responds equally to those in the EU and those without. 
Further, it assumes that EU and non-EU countries respond identically to others taxes. 
Our analysis rejects both restrictions. In particular, we find robust evidence that EU 
countries respond more to other member nations’ taxes. This does indeed suggest that 
as the EU expands, it forces existing members to respond more to the low taxes of 
new members than they did previously. 
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 In the next section, we provide a simple model of tax competition to motivate 
our weighting scheme. Section 3 describes our empirical approach and our data. 
Results are contained in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Simple Model of Tax Competition 
 In this section, we present a very simple, stylized model of tax competition. 
This model lacks many of the complicating features of more advanced models, 
however, its parsimony allows us to derive in a straightforward manner a set of results 
that yields theory-motivated weights describing the relative slopes of best response 
functions. 
 Consider a setting in which there are a large number of firms and three 
countries. The  firms are indexed by i  and the countries are indexed by l  where N
{ }1, 2,3l∈ .  Each firm i  produces a good in a single country but sells that good in 
each of the three countries by exporting.4 The inverse demand curve in country  is: l
 ( ) ( )
2l l l
p i A q iα= −  (1) 
where  is the amount firm i  sells in country .( )lq i l
5 Production is constant returns to 
scale in each country  where the local per-unit production cost is . When 
producing in country l  and exporting to country 
l lw
j , the firm incurs a per-unit trade 
cost of  where . These components combine to form the firm’s taxable 
profits which, when firm i  locates in country l , are: 
,l jc , 0l lc =
                                                 
4 Thus, we are not admitting the possibility of horizontal multinationals of the Markusen (1984) type 
that produce in multiple countries to serve local markets while avoiding trade costs. An alternative 
method of arriving at this equilibrium setup is to allow the possibility but, as in Markusen, introduce 
fixed costs of constructing additional plants. When these fixed costs are sufficiently large, firms will 
endogenously choose this purely exporting structure. 
5 Note that for simplicity, we assume that there are no product or factor market interactions among 
firms. 
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3 3 3
,
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j l j l j j
j j j
p i q i w q i c q i
= = =
− −∑ ∑ ∑ . (2) 
The firm pays tax rate  on these taxable profits. In addition, when located in country 
, firm i  receives an additional amount of untaxable income 
lt
l ( )l iε . This term is 
identically and independently distributed across firms and locations according to a log 
Weibull distribution with mean zero. Thus, when firm i  locates in country , its total 
profits are: 
l
 ( ) 3 3 3 ,
1 1 1
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )l l j j l j l j j
j j j
i t p i q i w q i c q i ilπ ε
= = =
⎛ ⎞= − − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑ .
6 (3) 
Defining ,l j j l l j,A w cΦ ≡ − − , the profit maximizing quantity produced in l and sold in 
j is  
 1 ,jq α − l j= Φ .7 (4) 
 
As a result, equilibrium profits in location l are: 
 ( ) 31 1 2,
1
( ) 1 2 ( )l l l j
j
i t l iπ α− −
=
= − Φ +∑ ε
j
 (5) 
or defining market potential (which is also the tax base) as  
3
1 1 2
,
1
2l l
j
α− −
=
Π = Φ∑
 ( )( ) 1 ( )l l li t l iπ ε= − Π + . (6) 
 
 Each firm locates in the region offering it the greatest equilibrium profits. 
Similar to the derivation of the Logit estimator (see Greene, 2007, for details), the 
probability that any given firm i  locates in country l  (denoted ) is: lP
                                                 
6 Note that we do not permit the possibility of setting up foreign subsidiaries. If these were allowed, it 
would be necessary to take account of other nations’ taxes both in the location choice (where we would 
have to account for repatriation taxes and double taxation conventions) and a country’s chosen tax rate 
(since this would include impacts on subsidiaries located within it). Although these issues are clearly of 
importance when discussing multinational firms and taxation, since our goal is to illustrate the 
motivation for our weighting scheme in as transparent a manner possible, we omit them here. 
7 We assume that this is positive for simplicity. If not, no production occurs in the country. 
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( )
( )3
1
exp 1
exp 1
l l
l
j j
j
t
P
t
=
− Π⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=
⎡ ⎤− Π⎣ ⎦∑
. (7) 
Note that: 
 ( )1l l l l
l
dP P P
dt
0= − Π <  (8) 
i.e. as a country’s tax rises, the probability of hosting a given firm falls. Conversely: 
 0l l j j
j
dP PP
dt
= Π >  (9) 
i.e. a rise in another nation’s tax increases l’s chance at hosting a given firm. 
Aggregating across the large number of firms implies that (at least in expected 
value) the equilibrium number of firms that location l  hosts is  and that its tax 
revenues are: 
lP
 l l lt PNΠ . (10) 
 Governments simultaneously choose tax rates in order to maximize their own 
tax revenues. For country l , this yields an optimal value of its tax: 
 ( ) 1 11l lt P − l−= − Π  (11) 
where  depends on all three tax rates. From this, we can calculate the slope of the 
best response function for country  with respect to the tax rate of country : 
lP
l k l≠
 ( )2 01
l l k k
k l l
dt PP
dt P
Π= >− Π  (12) 
i.e. tax rates are strategic complements. Comparing this between countries i  and  
for country l , we see that: 
k
 
( )
( )
exp 1
exp 1
l
j j jj j j
l k k k k k
k
dt
tdt P
dt P t
dt
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− Π ΠΠ ⎣ ⎦⎜= = ⎜ ⎟⎟Π − Π Π⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
. (13) 
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This corresponds to a greater sensitivity to the tax rate in countries that have greater 
market potentials. The intuition here is straightforward. If country j is an attractive 
location relative to k (in expected value terms), this is because pre-tax profits 
generated by a firm located there are large compared to those that could be generated 
in k. This then means that a drop in j’s tax rate creates a bigger increase in profits than 
does a comparable fall in k’s tax. In turn, this increases the sensitivity of firm location 
to j’s tax than k’s, implying that l must be more cognizant of j’s tax when setting its 
own.  
 Several factors feed into the relative profitability of a given location 
represented by the dependency of the tax base on three factors that vary by location. 
First, countries with bigger local demands – i.e. a high  – are more profitable 
locations. This is because firms in this location can serve the local market without 
suffering trade costs. Second, a location with low wage costs ( ) is advantageous for 
obvious reasons. Third, a location with easy access to other locations, represented by 
low s, are more profitable because of its suitability as an export platform. This is 
akin to the growing interest in “third market” effects in the FDI literature where 
research has expanded the notion of market size to include not only the host country 
itself but also markets that can be accessed from a particular host.
lA
lw
,l jc
8 
Note that this latter term is one of major interest for us since the expansion of 
the EU would indicate a rise in the relative sensitivity of old EU countries to the new 
member’s tax rates as new members gain better access to EU markets. This is because 
such variation in trade costs, both across different countries and for a given country 
over time, should affect the weight that its tax receives in other countries’ decision 
                                                 
8 Theory work in this area includes Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) while empirical work 
includes Head and Mayer (2004), Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, Naughton (2007), and Baltagi, Egger, 
and Pfaffermayer (2007). 
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problems.  As such, our model would then lend theoretic credence to the concerns that 
expanding the EU to the low-cost east will force western nations to respond to their 
tax regimes. Examine such possibilities is the goal of our empirical investigation. 
 
3. Empirical Specification and Data 
 In this section, we outline our empirical approach and describe our data. 
3.1. Empirical Specification 
Given that (11) indicates that the tax depends on the product of various terms, 
we linearize our model by taking the natural log of all non-binary variables. Thus, 
following Devereux, Lockwood, Redoano (2008), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2007), 
and Overesch and Rincke (2008), our log-linear baseline specification takes the form:  
 , , , ,l t l t lk t k t l t
k l
t X t ,β ρ ω ε
≠
= + +∑  (14) 
where  is the tax rate in country l  in year t , ,l tt ,l tX  is a vector of control variables 
specific to country l ,  is Spatial Lagl,t which is a weighted-sum of other 
countries' tax rates, and 
, ,lk t k t
k l
tω
≠
∑
,l tε  is an i.i.d. error term. Since taxes are interdependent, this 
second control is endogenous and is instrumented for using the weighted sum of other 
nations’ exogenous variables, i.e. by estimating: 
 , , , , ,lk t k t lk t l t l t
k l k l
t Xω β ω ε
≠ ≠
= +∑ ∑% % . (15) 
In these weighted sums, ,lk tω  is the weight that the tax rate in country  gets in 
country l 's observation for year .
k
t 9 As is common, we row-standardize so that the 
weights sum to one in each observation.10 Thus, using the result from (13) indicating 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that Altshuler and Goodspeed (2007) use the t-1 value of k’s tax in some 
regressions and that Overesch and Rincke (2008) use this in all their specifications. As discussed by 
Altshuler and Goodspeed, the interpretation of this coefficient would be the slope of the best response 
in a Stackelberg game as opposed to the simultaneous move one in Section 2.  
10 See Anselin (1988) on details of row standardization.  
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that relative weights are proportional to market potential, we construct our weights so 
that: 
 ( ),, ,
ln
ln
j t
lj t
k t
k l
ω
≠
Π= Π∑  (16) 
which is modified from the model so that the terms can vary over time.11 Thus, our 
theory motivated weighting scheme is the relative market potential of a given country. 
To construct these weights, it is tempting to use a variable such as GDP. This, 
however, is problematic on two counts. First, GDP is the sum of domestic 
consumption plus net exports. Market potential, however, is domestic consumption 
plus gross exports. Since one reason for a firm to choose a given host is that doing so 
replaces imports, it is necessary to account for this. Second, GDP depends on the 
number of firms attracted and is therefore endogenous. We must therefore construct 
exogenous proxies for the weights in order to estimate (14), otherwise the right-hand 
side control variables will not be exogenous. Likewise, a variable such as distance, 
although exogenous, does not account for access to third markets. While it might well 
be the case that a proximate country could easily attract a firm from country l vis-à-vis 
its ability to serve l’s market, bilateral distance says nothing about that country’s 
ability to export to the rest of the world. If firms make location decisions based on the 
ability to serve several markets from an existing location, then bilateral distance 
(which itself is but one component of trade costs) is not the most appropriate weight. 
Finally, since market potential clearly varies by country, it is inappropriate to utilize 
equal weights across countries. This then highlights the importance of using a theory-
motivated weighting scheme as the results in the next section make clear. 
                                                 
11 Note that since the tax rates are endogenous, we do not use them in the construction of the weights. 
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As described in more detail below, this baseline specification is modified in 
several ways to obtain a more nuanced picture of the extent of tax competition. In 
particular, we will modify (14) to allow the slope of the best response ( ρ ) to vary 
depending on whether the other country l≠  is a member of the EU and then again to 
depend on whether country l itself is an EU member. 
3.2 Data 
 Our data is an unbalanced panel of countries spanning 1980-2005. The list of 
countries and years they first appear in our sample is found in Table 1.12 Note that 
since some of the countries do not enter until the second half of our sample 
(particularly the eastern European ones), one of our robustness checks will be to re-
estimate the model using just the years 1995-2005 so that we have a balanced panel. 
All non-binary variables are measured in logs. 
 The primary limit to the scope of our sample is the availability of tax rate data. 
For the majority of the presented results, we use the effective average tax rate 
(EATR). Since the firms’ choice of location in our model is an inframarginal 
investment decision, as argued in Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2003) the EATR is the 
relevant measure of taxation. We utilize their approach along with the data of Loretz 
(2008) to calculate our EATR measure. The appendix gives additional detail on the 
construction of the EATR. In addition to this tax measure, in some robustness checks 
we instead use the statutory rate rather than this average effective rate. 
 Seven variables comprise the vector of exogenous explanatory variables 
,l tX For our measure of a nation’s market potential, Market Potentiall,t, we use the 
sum of domestic consumption and exports, measured in millions of constant US 
                                                 
12 Tax rate data were also available for India beginning with 1998 and Russia beginning with 2003. 
Due to the late start of their data, they are excluded from the presented results. However, in unreported 
results using them, similar estimates are found. 
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dollars (base year 2000). For each country-year, this is constructed by using the 
corresponding GDP, which is domestic consumption and net exports, and adding a 
nation’s total imports back into this, and then taking the natural log. In order to 
construct exogenous proxies of market potential for country i in year t, we estimated 
the following equation: 
 
,
2
, 0 1 , 2 3 , 4l tl t l t l t t l l t
MarketPotential Population Population EU Trend ,η η η η η η ε= + + + + + +
 (17) 
i.e. Market Potentiall,t, as a function of (logged) population and its square, EU 
membership, a time trend, and country specific fixed effects. The use of fixed effects 
is intended to control for proximity to other markets. As found by Blongien, Davies, 
Waddell, and Naughton (2007), this is typically sufficient to control for this factor 
when predicting FDI activity. The results of this regression are found in Appendix. 
Here, we simply note two items. First, the R2 from this regression was .994, 
suggesting that the bulk of the variation is captured. Second, the significance of fixed 
effects indicates that using population instead of predicted market potential leaves out 
important information. This proxy is then used as both a control variable as well as to 
construct the weights for spatial lag term. Given the evidence found elsewhere 
indicating a positive correlation between GDP and tax rates and the ability of 
countries with large market potentials to attract investment even with higher tax rates, 
we anticipate a positive coefficient for this variable.  
 In addition to Market Potentiall,t, as controls in (14), we include Gov. 
Expendituresl,t-1, which is government expenditures as a share of GDP. Note that we 
are assuming that although GDP and government expenditures might vary with the 
tax rate, that the ratio of the two does not. As additional insurance against 
13 
 
endogeneity, we use the lagged value of this variable.13 Consistent with the 
expectation that governments with large expenditure requirements will have less 
ability to lower taxes to compete for investment, we anticipate a positive coefficient. 
We also include two demographic variables. Urbanl,t is the percentage of the 
population living in urban areas. Dependencyl,t, is the ratio of the dependents to the 
working age population. Given the results of Devereux, et al. (2008), we anticipate a 
negative coefficient for the dependency ratio. All of the above mentioned variables 
were obtained from the 2008 World Development Indicators with the exception of EU 
membership information, which was obtained from Wikipedia.org.14 
 In addition to these, we constructed Opennessl,t, which is the ratio of exports to 
market potential and is intended to mirror a similar variable used in other papers. 
Here, not only must we deal with the endogeneity of market potential, but also 
exports. Thus, to construct exogenous predictions for exports, we estimate a gravity 
model of the form15: 
  (18) ,
,
2
, , 0 , 1 , 2 3 ,
2
4 5 , , 6 ,
l t
j t
l j t l t l t j t
l j t t l t
Exports Population Population Population
Population Regional Trend
κ κ κ κ κ
κ κ η ε
= + + + +
+ + + +
where is a direction-pair specific fixed effect and Regionall,j,t is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the countries are both members of a regional trade agreement.
,l tκ
16 This 
latter variable was obtained from Rose (2005). Export data came from the IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics and population data again come from the World Bank. 
While the full details of this regression can be found in the appendix, here we merely 
note that the R2 for predicting exports is .954.  
                                                 
13 In unreported results, we used the contemporaneous value of government expenditures, with little 
change in our results. 
14 http://www.worldbank.org/data 
15 For details on gravity models, which are the standard for estimating trade levels, see Rose (2005). 
Note that, again due to the endogeneity of GDP, we utilize population rather than GDP to estimate 
exports. 
16 Note that this fixed effect controls for common trade predictors such as distance, island/landlocked 
status, shared colonial history, and common language. 
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We include a dummy variable  for EU membership. Since EU 
membership grows over time, our robustness checks include a set of regressions 
where rather than utilizing EU membership, we use a dummy variable equal to one 
only for the EU15 countries, a categorization which includes the major members of 
the EU but does not vary in size over time. Table 1 indicates the countries that fall 
into this category. Finally we include a time trend and, in some specifications, fixed 
effects. Fixed effects are useful in filtering out the impact of country specific but time 
invariant factors such as geography, placement in physical space on the globe, 
national attitudes towards taxation, and the like. 
,l tEU
Summary statistics for our variables are found in Table 2. As a final note, due 
to the construction of explanatory variables, we bootstrap our error terms fifty times 
in all regressions. 
 
4. Results 
   Table 3 presents our baseline results. Column 1 utilizes our set of control 
variables without any spatial lag. This is in order to compare our results to those 
typically found in the literature. We find that, as expected, countries with larger 
(instrumented) market potentials have higher taxes. This would be consistent with the 
notion that these countries have advantages that allow them to set higher taxes without 
deterring firms from locating there. Consistent with other studies, we also find that 
countries with high government expenditures relative to GDP, urban populations, and 
low dependency ratios all have higher taxes. In addition, we find that EU members 
tend to have lower taxes. Although it is not always significant, similar to other studies 
we find more open countries have higher taxes. Finally, our trend term highlights the 
oft-discussed downward trend in taxes. Comparing these estimates across 
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specifications in this and subsequent tables shows that these findings are generally 
consistent across specifications.  
Column 2 introduces the spatial lag in which countries are weighted according 
to their market potential. In particular, this column uses endogenous market potential, 
not that derived from estimating (17). We do this in order to highlight the potential 
biases that might arise from failure to account for the endogeneity of the weights. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Column 2’s estimates include a negative spatial lag, 
indicative of strategic substitutes. This is not in line with the standard thinking in tax 
competition theory in which tax rates at home are positively correlated with those 
abroad. Column 3 augments this specification by adding country specific fixed effects 
to the model. As is often found in spatial lag estimations, inclusion of fixed effects 
results in an insignificant spatial lag. In our estimation, this would be consistent with 
the negative spatial lag in column 2 resulting from unobserved country heterogeneity.  
In columns 4 and 5, we repeat the estimations of 2 and 3 but now allow for 
different coefficients for the weighted sum of non-EU and EU tax rates. This implies 
two changes. First, it relaxes the restriction that a given tax rate is weighted the same 
regardless of whether the country in question is an EU member or not. If market 
potential is an important factor in determining weights and itself depends on EU 
membership, it may be reasonable to relax this assumption. Furthermore, if firms 
follow a sequential location decision – i.e. first deciding to locate somewhere within 
the EU and then deciding which member to locate in – combining members and non-
members may be inappropriate. Second, as is common practice, we row standardize 
our weights as in (16). This then increases the absolute weight a given country 
receives because the denominator falls. Note that since it falls by the same amount for 
all countries remaining in the category, relative weights across countries within a 
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category do not change. As discussed in detail by Overesch and Rincke (2008), as the 
number of countries in the sample grow, the weight given to any given country 
becomes small, leading the spatial lag to become roughly constant across countries. 
Separating the countries into groups as we do reduces this problem since it increases 
the magnitude of the weight assigned to each individual country.  
As columns 4 and 5, these changes are important enough to alter the sign of 
the estimated spatial lag. In particular, we now find significantly positive coefficients. 
This indicates that combining EU and non-EU countries is not appropriate. Therefore, 
for the rest of the paper, we will estimate spatial lags for these two groups separately. 
In columns 6 and 7, we utilize the specifications of 4 and 5 with one key difference: 
we replace the endogenous market potential with the constructed value when creating 
the spatial lag. This then protects us against any endogeneity bias arising from 
endogenous weights. Comparing 4 and 6, we see that this makes relatively small 
changes in the magnitude of our spatial lags although their significance increases. As 
in column 5, the inclusion of fixed effects is sufficient to eliminate significance of the 
spatial lags although it is worth noting that correcting for the endogeneity of the 
weights is sufficient to move the point estimates from negative to positive. 
These results indicate that tax rates are strategic complements – i.e. as other 
countries lower their EATRs the country in question lowers its own as well. In 
addition, it responds much more fiercely to tax changes by EU members than non-
members, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, note that 
we fail to reject they hypothesis that the coefficient on the EU spatial lag is less than 
one, implying that an increase in all EU taxes of 1% leads to a less than 1% change in 
this country’s tax. If this is an equilibrium, then in game theoretic terms this result 
implies stability of the Nash equilibrium. Finally, since the inclusion of fixed effects 
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eliminates the significance of the spatial lags, this suggests that the bulk of the results 
are driven by cross-sectional variation rather than time series variation.17 As will be 
shown below, however, this does not hold true when we allow for different responses 
by EU and non-EU countries to a given country’s tax. 
Table 4 further analyzes our choice of weighting matrix by comparing our 
results from Table 3, column 6 (which are repeated in Table 4, column 1) with those 
that would be reached when using an alternative weighting scheme. In column 2, we 
weight countries by their GDPs ala Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008). In 
column 3, following Altshuler and Goodspeed (2007) and Overesch and Rinke 
(2008), we instead weight countries by their distance from country . Finally, along 
the lines of Garretsen and Peeters (2007), Redoano (2007), Dreher (2006), and 
Haufler, Klemm, and Schjelderup (2006), column 4 uses the simple average of tax 
rates. In each case, rather than finding the theory-consistent, significantly positive 
spatial lags our market potential weights yield, we find an insignificantly positive 
spatial lags for non-EU taxes and significantly negative spatial lags for EU taxes. In 
unreported results using fixed effects, these weighting schemes continued to yield 
these unexpected results. Restricting our sample of countries to more closely resemble 
those of other papers yields similar estimates, although the significance of the non-EU 
lag generally increased (see the appendix for these results as well as more direct 
comparisons to their methodology). This illustrates how the importance of properly 
specifying the weighting scheme since these other schemes yield results at odds with 
both the theory and the widely-held belief that taxes are positively correlated across 
l
                                                 
17 This naturally raises the question of whether or not to include fixed effects. A quick inspection of R2s 
shows that they do increase the fit of the estimation specification. However, if the variable of interest 
varies primarily in cross-section than over time, this better fit may well have to be sacrificed in order to 
examine the question at hand. This is often a tradeoff in international settings where items such as 
geography do not change, requiring one to omit fixed effects in order to examine, for example, the 
impact of distance on trade. 
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borders.18 Outside of this, the estimates for the other control variables remain largely 
comparable across specifications. 
Thus, when using exogenous values for market potential and omitting fixed 
effects, we find results that are in line with those predicted by theory. In particular, we 
find that it is important to distinguish between EU and non-EU taxes when estimating 
spatial lags. In Table 5, we examine not only whether a given country responds 
differently to EU and non-EU taxes, but also on whether its response to a given set of 
countries depends on whether it is itself an EU member. To this end, we now interact 
our two spatial lag terms with the EU membership dummy variable. In column 1, we 
find results similar to those above, namely that taxes are strategic complements. 
However, not all countries respond in the same way. For a non-EU member, this slope 
of the best response is statistically equal between EU and non-EU countries (i.e. Non-
EU Spatial Lagl,t and EU Spatial Lagl,t have statistically equal coefficients). In 
comparison to the above results, the difference in these magnitudes is smaller, with a 
mere 34 percent difference (as compared to the 60 percent difference in Table 3). EU 
members, however respond quite differently to the two groups. While members 
respond the same to EU taxes as non-members do (since the coefficient on the 
interaction EUl,t * EU Spatial Lagl,t, is insignificant), their response to non-member 
taxes is only half as large with a point estimate of .328. Furthermore, there is a 
significant difference in how EU members respond to the tax of other members as to 
the tax of non-members. As illustrated by column 2, this difference is robust to the 
inclusion of fixed effects. This is a marked difference from the results of Table 3, 
column 7. This shows that there is indeed important time series variation in tax 
                                                 
18 In unreported results, we repeated the specifications of Table 4 but combine the taxes of EU and non-
EU countries. For the analog to column 1, we find a significantly negative spatial lag, thus mirroring 
the differences between when doing so with endogenous market potential in Table 3. Unlike Table 3, 
this is robust to the inclusion of fixed effects. The other three schemes in Table 4 resulted in 
insignificant spatial lags.  
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competition, but that this is masked by restricting the responses of EU and non-EU 
countries to be the same. Furthermore, our estimates give credence to the concern that 
as countries switch into the EU that it forces existing members to respond more 
fiercely to their tax cuts. 
Table 6 reassesses these results with respect to two aspects of our data: that it 
includes countries from around the globe and that it is an unbalanced panel. Columns 
1 and 2 repeat the estimates of Table 5 but utilize only European countries.19 Since 
EU countries are in Europe, it may be that the difference in response rates arises due 
to the fact that EU members are more geographically concentrated. Thus, the results 
may be driven by the different locations of the two groups rather than impacts on 
trade engendered by their EU status. As the estimates indicate, however, this is not the 
case as our results are very similar to those in Table 5 (although significance declines 
slightly as the number of observations declines). To deal with the unbalanced panel, 
columns 3 and 4 repeat Table 5 but restrict the time series to 1995-2005, a restriction 
that creates balance within our panel. Here, we again find results qualitatively the 
same as those in Table 5 both with and without fixed effects.20 Thus, our evidence for 
tax competition is robust to these subsamples of the data. 
Table 7 addresses a different time series aspect of our data, namely that EU 
membership has grown over time. Thus, one might be concerned that the differences 
found between EU and non-EU countries may result from changes in the composition 
of membership over time rather than the increased sensitivity to one another’s taxes 
membership in the Union might create. To address this, in Table 7 rather than 
defining our spatial lags according to EU membership, we define them according to 
whether or not a country is an EU15 nation. We also change our interactions in this 
                                                 
19 The countries that fall into this group are listed in Table 1.  
20 It should be noted that column 3 is the sole specification where spatial lags are significantly greater 
than 1. 
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way, were EU membership is replaced by a dummy variable indicating EU15 status. 
As this does not change over time, countries do not change categories and these 
difference are therefore not driven by changes in membership. Columns 1 and 2 
repeat the final two columns of Table 3. Here we find largely comparable results. This 
gives some indication that our results are not spuriously driven by increasing EU 
membership. Columns 3 and 4 introduce our interactions as in Table 5. Again, we find 
results largely similar to those before although we no significant response to EU15 
countries’ taxes when including fixed effects. Since EU15 status does not change over 
time, this insignificance when relying exclusively on time series variation is not 
particularly surprising. In any case, the use of EU15 status alleviates concerns that our 
results are driven solely by increasing EU membership.  
Finally, Table 8 repeats the results of Table 5 but uses the statutory tax rate 
rather than the effective average tax rate. Here, we find a similar story as above: 
positive spatial lags across groups with EU members responding more to EU member 
taxes than non-member taxes. The only notable difference is that we also find a 
significantly positive coefficient on the EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t interaction, again 
suggesting increases sensitivity to other members’ taxes. Excepting this latter result, 
these results hold even with the inclusion of fixed effects. Thus, as in Devereux, 
Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) and Overesche and Rinke (2008), we find 
competition in both effective and statutory tax rates. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The goal of this paper has been to investigate whether any evidence can be 
found to support the notion that expansion of the European Union has exacerbated tax 
competition. To do so, rather than rely on the ad-hoc methods used elsewhere, we use 
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theory to derive a weighting scheme for use in estimation. The theory indicates that 
market potential, that is the size of the domestic market combined with access to 
foreign markets, is the appropriate weight. Utilizing this weight, we find reasonably 
robust evidence of tax competition. In particular, we find that while non-EU members 
respond equally to other countries regardless of membership, EU members distinguish 
between the two with a greater response due to other members’ taxes. This then lends 
credence to the concerns expressed in policy circles that expansion of the EU may 
lead to more aggressive tax competition.  
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Table 1: Countries in the Sample 
 
Country First Year 
in Sample 
Year 
Joined the 
EU 
Country First Year in 
Sample 
Year 
Joined the 
EU 
Australia 1982 - Korea 1996 - 
Austria*† 1982 1995 Latvia* 1996 2004 
Belgium*† 1982 1957 Lithuania* 1996 2004 
Bulgaria* 1994 2007 Luxembourg*† 1991 1957 
Canada 1980 - Malta* 1989 2004 
China 1991 - Mexico 1995 - 
Cyprus* 1994 2004 Netherlands*† 1980 1957 
Czech 
Republic* 
1991 2004 New Zealand 1991 - 
Denmark*† 1986 1973 Norway* 1982 - 
Estonia* 1994 2004 Poland* 1992 2004 
Finland*† 1982 1995 Portugal*† 1982 1986 
France*† 1980 1957 Slovak 
Republic* 
1991 2004 
Germany*† 1980 1957 Slovenia* 1995 2004 
Greece*† 1980 1981 Spain*† 1980 1986 
Hungary* 1991 2004 Sweden*† 1982 1995 
Iceland 1992 - Switzerland* 1982 - 
Ireland*† 1980 1973 UK*† 1980 1973 
Italy*† 1980 1957 United States 1980 - 
Japan 1980 -    
 
* denotes European country. † denotes EU15 country. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Effective Average 
Tax Ratel,t 
680 -1.254246 .3674647 -2.615606 -.6329393 
Statutory Tax Ratel,t 680 -1.085281 .3581699 -2.302585 -.4827252 
Market Potentiall,t 680 12.21358 2.029293 8.243695 19.12246 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 680 2.914555 .2331098 2.265194 3.399302 
Urbanl,t 680 4.252471 .1920743 3.339322 4.577799 
Dependencyl,t 680 -.7028915 .08965 -.9404324 -.3581957 
EUl,t 680 .4470588 .4975553 0 1 
Opennessl,t 680 -3.083244 4.421151 -11.63395 9.444099 
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Table 3: Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Weight:  Endo. Mkt. Pot. Endo. Mkt. Pot. Endo. Mkt. Pot. Endo. Mkt. Pot. Exo. Mkt. Pot. Exo. Mkt. Pot.
        
Spatial Lagl,t  -0.664*** 0.006     
  (0.176) (0.255)     
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t    0.538** -0.074 0.547*** 0.106 
    (0.211) (0.120) (0.176) (0.086) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t    1.384*** -0.200 1.342*** 0.311 
    (0.507) (0.299) (0.454) (0.219) 
Market Potentiall,t 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 1.251*** 0.087*** 1.381*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.230) (0.013) (0.259) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 0.298*** 0.292*** 0.298*** 0.304*** -0.240** 0.313*** -0.211* 
 (0.060) (0.054) (0.050) (0.058) (0.108) (0.055) (0.111) 
Urbanl,t 0.520*** 0.526*** 0.520*** 0.639*** 0.310* 0.630*** 0.319* 
 (0.091) (0.085) (0.068) (0.086) (0.186) (0.080) (0.193) 
Dependencyl,t -1.140*** -1.175*** -1.141*** -1.176*** -0.782*** -1.216*** -0.792*** 
 (0.246) (0.219) (0.210) (0.219) (0.163) (0.213) (0.129) 
EUl,t -0.076*** -0.065** -0.076*** -0.084*** -0.260*** -0.084*** -0.263*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.036) (0.023) (0.038) 
Opennessl,t 0.010* 0.010 0.010* 0.009 0.229 0.008 0.283** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.148) (0.006) (0.136) 
Trendt -0.027*** -0.056*** -0.026** 0.034 -0.081*** 0.036* -0.066*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) 
Constant -5.730*** -6.028*** -5.727*** -4.955*** -15.977*** -5.068*** -16.953*** 
 (0.697) (0.646) (0.550) (0.719) (2.424) (0.556) (2.700) 
        
Observations 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 
R-squared 0.403 0.418 0.403 0.409 0.860 0.413 0.861 
        
Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Comparison across Weighting Schemes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Weight: Market Potential GDP Distance Simple Average
     
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t 0.547*** 0.169 0.117 0.091 
 (0.166) (0.172) (0.128) (0.136) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t 1.342*** -0.332*** -0.274*** -0.277*** 
 (0.407) (0.077) (0.087) (0.072) 
Market Potentiall,t 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 0.313*** 0.284*** 0.286*** 0.285*** 
 (0.050) (0.047) (0.052) (0.063) 
Urbanl,t 0.630*** 0.530*** 0.530*** 0.523*** 
 (0.083) (0.063) (0.082) (0.091) 
Dependencyl,t -1.216*** -1.104*** -1.117*** -1.108*** 
 (0.197) (0.189) (0.240) (0.238) 
EUl,t -0.084*** -0.439*** -0.373*** -0.372*** 
 (0.025) (0.093) (0.100) (0.087) 
Opennessl,t 0.008 0.012** 0.011 0.012* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Trendt 0.036** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.028*** 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Constant -5.068*** -5.610*** -5.645*** -5.613*** 
 (0.530) (0.475) (0.634) (0.669) 
     
Observations 680 680 680 680 
R-squared 0.413 0.422 0.421 0.421 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5: EU versus non-EU Responses 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t 0.783*** 0.257** 
 (0.146) (0.112) 
EUl,t *Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t -0.455*** -0.158* 
 (0.134) (0.087) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t 1.196*** 0.678** 
 (0.413) (0.307) 
EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t 0.479 -0.163 
 (0.355) (0.252) 
Market Potentiall,t 0.093*** 1.818*** 
 (0.013) (0.326) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 0.304*** -0.110 
 (0.059) (0.084) 
Urbanl,t 0.655*** 0.412** 
 (0.077) (0.203) 
Dependencyl,t -1.235*** -0.753*** 
 (0.200) (0.158) 
EUl,t 0.046 -0.636*** 
 (0.324) (0.237) 
Opennessl,t 0.010* 0.227 
 (0.005) (0.159) 
Trendt 0.038** -0.070*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant -5.205*** -22.468***
 (0.683) (3.289) 
   
Observations 680 680 
R-squared 0.440 0.869 
   
Fixed Effects No Yes 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Alternative Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Only European Countries Only 1995-2005 
     
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t 0.805*** 0.481*** 2.669*** 0.786* 
 (0.198) (0.178) (0.538) (0.473) 
EUl,t *Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t -0.642*** -0.230* -0.448* -0.074 
 (0.183) (0.126) (0.252) (0.115) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t 1.055 0.796** 3.993*** 1.290* 
 (0.686) (0.376) (0.783) (0.684) 
EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t 0.491 0.063 -0.072 -0.281 
 (0.534) (0.325) (0.327) (0.199) 
Market Potentiall,t 0.207*** 3.432*** 0.108*** 2.274*** 
 (0.029) (0.805) (0.015) (0.757) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 0.422*** -0.093 0.337*** -0.598*** 
 (0.050) (0.127) (0.064) (0.166) 
Urbanl,t 0.544*** 0.188 1.119*** 0.563 
 (0.125) (0.299) (0.137) (0.448) 
Dependencyl,t -1.882*** -0.977*** -1.055*** 0.261 
 (0.261) (0.162) (0.204) (0.319) 
EUl,t -0.167 -0.559** -0.688* -0.755*** 
 (0.488) (0.282) (0.375) (0.217) 
Opennessl,t 0.051*** 0.229 0.005 0.318 
 (0.012) (0.273) (0.007) (0.237) 
Trendt 0.019 -0.108*** 0.167*** -0.050 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.038) (0.050) 
Constant -6.593*** -38.940*** -3.763*** -24.943*** 
 (0.791) (8.530) (0.672) (7.221) 
     
Observations 516 516 395 395 
R-squared 0.500 0.878 0.424 0.877 
     
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Using EU15 Designation Instead of EU Membership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Non-EU15 Spatial Lagl,t 0.560*** 0.083 0.749*** 0.329*** 
 (0.160) (0.103) (0.191) (0.110) 
EU15l,t *Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t   -0.201*** -0.176** 
   (0.070) (0.070) 
EU15 Spatial Lagl,t 1.012*** 0.141 1.099*** 0.323 
 (0.351) (0.169) (0.309) (0.214) 
EU15l,t *EU15 Spatial Lagl,t   -0.038 0.042 
   (0.071) (0.206) 
Market Potentiall,t 0.090*** 1.359*** 0.109*** 1.796*** 
 (0.013) (0.296) (0.015) (0.319) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 0.296*** -0.221* 0.242*** -0.207* 
 (0.045) (0.114) (0.065) (0.121) 
Urbanl,t 0.575*** 0.319 0.595*** 0.384* 
 (0.077) (0.224) (0.085) (0.219) 
Dependencyl,t -1.156*** -0.775*** -1.310*** -0.797*** 
 (0.249) (0.192) (0.219) (0.141) 
EUl,t -0.091*** -0.266*** -0.289*** -0.314*** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.040) (0.040) 
Opennessl,t 0.009 0.281* 0.019*** 0.311* 
 (0.006) (0.164) (0.007) (0.173) 
Trendt 0.033** -0.069*** 0.041*** -0.073*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -5.139*** -16.817*** -5.241*** -21.922*** 
 (0.569) (2.981) (0.596) (3.366) 
     
Observations 680 680 680 680 
R-squared 0.416 0.860 0.457 0.866 
     
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 8: Statutory Tax Rate Competition 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t 0.897*** 0.219* 
 (0.201) (0.120) 
EUl,t *Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t -0.513*** -0.217** 
 (0.124) (0.087) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t 1.247** 0.388* 
 (0.521) (0.232) 
EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t 0.529* -0.052 
 (0.273) (0.197) 
Market Potentiall,t 0.086*** 1.641*** 
 (0.018) (0.318) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 0.271*** 0.004 
 (0.050) (0.097) 
Urbanl,t 0.593*** 0.588*** 
 (0.090) (0.213) 
Dependencyl,t -1.326*** -0.627*** 
 (0.204) (0.166) 
EUl,t 0.040 -0.511*** 
 (0.201) (0.146) 
Opennessl,t 0.007 0.039 
 (0.008) (0.171) 
Trendt 0.042** -0.068*** 
 (0.021) (0.017) 
Constant -4.864*** -22.220***
 (0.592) (3.177) 
   
Observations 680 680 
R-squared 0.465 0.880 
   
Fixed Effects No Yes 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Average Tax Rates over Time 
 
32 
 
Appendix 
 
A.1 Construction of the EATR 
 
The EATR described by Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2003) measures the proportion of 
total income taken in tax from a hypothetical investment project (requiring one unit of 
capital for one period). More specifically, it is defined as the difference between the 
project’s net present value in the absence and presence of tax, scaled by the net present 
value of the pre-tax total income stream, net of depreciation: 
 
*
(1 )
R REATR
rρ
−= +  
The variable ρ  represents the project’s real financial return, r is the real interest rate, 
*R is the project’s net present value in the absence of tax, i.e. ( ) ( )* 1R r rρ= − + . 
Abstracting from personal income taxes, the project’s net present value in the presence of 
corporate tax is given by: 
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The variable δ  denotes the depreciation rate, τ is the statutory corporate income tax rate, 
 is the nominal interest rate, and i φ  is the rate at which capital expenditure can be offset 
against tax which is conditional on the type of capital employed. The variable  
represents additional costs or benefits due to the source of financing. If the project is 
completely financed by retained earnings or new equity, 
F
0F = . Note that new equity is 
an equivalent source of finance to retained earnings when abstracting from shareholder 
taxation and informational asymmetries. If the project is completely financed by debt, 
( ) ( )1 1F i iτ τφ= − + , which is positive due to the deductibility of interest payments. 
For calculating EATRs , we adopt following assumptions about parameter values from an 
EU Commission Report (Devereux, et al., 2008): the project’s real financial return ρ  is 
0.2, the real interest rate  is 0.05, and the nominal interest rate i  is 0.071. Retained 
earnings and new equity represent 65 percent and debt 35 percent of the source of 
financing. Furthermore, we assume that the investment consists of machinery for 50 
percent, of buildings for 28 percent, and of inventory for 22 percent. The depreciation 
rate 
r
δ  is assumed to be 0.1225 for machinery, 0.0361 for buildings and 0 for inventory. 
The information about countries’ tax parameters τ  and φ is taken from Loretz’s (2008) 
data. The statutory tax rate τ  is the top marginal tax on corporate income including 
representative local taxes. For each type of capital expenditure, the most favorable 
available depreciation scheme is assumed to apply when calculating values forφ .  
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A.2 Predicting Market Potential 
Populationl,t 0.835*** 
 (0.222) 
Populationl,t2 0.068* 
 (0.039) 
EUl,t 0.093*** 
 (0.025) 
Trendt 0.029*** 
 (0.001) 
Constant 8.889*** 
 (0.377) 
  
Observations 885 
R-squared 0.994 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Includes country specific fixed effects. 
 
A.3 Predicting Exports 
 (1) (2) 
 Our Method GDP Method
   
Exporter Populationl,t -2.759***  
 (0.209)  
Exporter Populationl,t2 0.269***  
 (0.025)  
Importer Populationj,t -0.933***  
 (0.185)  
Importer Populationj,t2 0.184***  
 (0.023)  
RTAl,j,t 0.265*** 0.296*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Trendt 0.070*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Exporter GDPl,t  1.317*** 
  (0.034) 
Importer GDPj,t  0.950*** 
  (0.041) 
Constant 9.016*** -21.728*** 
 (0.515) (0.628) 
Observations 25942 25411 
R-squared 0.954 0.960 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Includes directional, pair-specific fixed effects. 
Column 2 utilizes GDP rather than population, a more standard formulation of the gravity 
specification of trade flows. As can be seen, we find similar results using our population 
method with the added benefit of exogeneity of the control variable. 
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A.4 Replicating Other Papers 
In Table 4, our estimates differ from those of other papers in two key ways. First, we 
have a different sample of countries. Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) use only 
OECD countries. Overesche and Rincke (2008) use only European countries (which, like 
us, includes central and eastern European countries as well as the western ones). Second, 
they estimate a single spatial lag. In order to reassure the reader that the differences in 
Table 4 are not due to different underlying data, here we present results using our data 
but restricting our sample to those in each of these papers and using a single spatial lag. 
These results, reported below, show that when doing so we find a significantly positive 
spatial lag in the Devereux, Lockwood, Redoano-type regression (column 1) and a 
positive but insignificant spatial lag in the Overesche and Rincke-type regression 
(column 3). Thus, these results indicate that when using their approach we find results 
similar to what they did. Finally, columns 2 and 4 repeat these regressions using the 
limited samples, but using our two spatial lags (one for the EU and one without the EU). 
These results demonstrate that the negative lags in Table 4 result from changing the lag 
structure, not from the different set of countries in the samples. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano Overesche and Rincke
Spatial Lagl,t 0.618*  0.070  
 (0.365)  (0.320)  
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t  0.954***  -0.053 
  (0.228)  (0.115) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t  -0.393***  -0.487***
  (0.140)  (0.082) 
Market Potentiall,t -0.045* -0.050*** -0.082*** -0.083***
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 0.400*** 0.374*** 0.386*** 0.402*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.062) (0.065) 
Urbanl,t 0.250** 0.223** 0.473*** 0.369*** 
 (0.112) (0.095) (0.136) (0.110) 
Dependencyl,t -2.228*** -2.280*** -1.748*** -1.792***
 (0.232) (0.207) (0.271) (0.239) 
EUl,t -0.104*** -0.539*** -0.096*** -0.616***
 (0.021) (0.156) (0.033) (0.107) 
Opennessl,t -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.033*** -0.032***
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trendt -0.001 0.007 -0.020 -0.044***
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010) 
Constant -3.835*** -3.402*** -4.265*** -3.681***
 (0.760) (0.651) (0.909) (0.630) 
     
Observations 516 516 522 522 
R-squared 0.479 0.497 0.437 0.482 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
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